Prehľad vývoja problematiky časovej konzistencie ekonomickej politiky

Issue: 2009/1

Adriana Lukáčiková

Fakulta hospodárskej informatiky Ekonomickej univerzity v Bratislave

Dolnozemská cesta 1

852 35 Bratislava

istvanik@euba.sk

Karol Szomolányi

Fakulta hospodárskej informatiky Ekonomickej univerzity v Bratislave

Dolnozemská cesta 1

852 35 Bratislava

(szomolan@euba.sk)

Martin Lukáčik

Fakulta hospodárskej informatiky Ekonomickej univerzity v Bratislave

Dolnozemská cesta 1

852 35 Bratislava

lukacik@euba.sk

V tomto článku poskytujeme celkový pohľad na vývoj problému časovej konzistencie v hospodárskej politike. Počiatky teórie položili Kynland a Prescott, ktorý poukázali na možné vysvetlenia inflácie či vysokého zdanenia spôsobené nedostatkom kredibility tvorcov hospodárskej politiky. Aj napriek tomu, že teória je jasná, v skutočnosti existujú ekonomiky, ktoré nemajú problémy s infláciou či vysokým zdanením. Vysvetlenie može spočívať v rôznych prístupoch: rovnováha trestu, reputácia, delegovanie, zmluvy o stimuloch a štruktúra vládneho dlhu.

Pages: 
44-66
Keywords: zmluvy o stimuloch a štruktúra vládneho dlhu., delegovanie, reputácia, ktoré nemajú problémy s infláciou či vysokým zdanením. Vysvetlenie može spočívať v rôznych prístupoch: rovnováha trestu, v skutočnosti existujú ekonomiky, že teória je jasná, ktorý poukázali na možné vysvetlenia inflácie či vysokého zdanenia spôsobené nedostatkom kredibility tvorcov hospodárskej politiky. Aj napriek tomu, V tomto článku poskytujeme celkový pohľad na vývoj problému časovej konzistencie v hospodárskej politike. Počiatky teórie položili Kynland a Prescott
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